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Recent Developments

Wynn v. State

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that to
apply Maryland Rule of Evidence
5-404(b), the absence of mistake
exception regarding evidence of
other acts or crimes, the defendant
must make some claim or raise the
defense that the crime for which he
or she is on trial was committed by
mistake. Wynn v. State, 351 Md.
307, 718 A.2d 588 (1998).
Furthermore, the crime or act
committed by mistake must be the
same crime or act for which he or
she is on trial. In this case, the
absence of mistake exception did
not apply because the defendant
did not claim he committed the
crime charged, housebreaking, by
mistake; he only claimed he
received stolen goods by mistake,
which was not the crime for which
he was on trial. Therefore, the
court opined that the State illegally
entered
evidence
of
the
defendant's past housebreaking
convictions. In so concluding, the
court reaffirmed Maryland Rule 5404(b) by limiting the State's use
of prior crimes and barring the
State from attempting to expand
the application of the rule.
As a result of breaking into
five separate dwellings, James
Othel Wynn ("Wynn") was
charged with various offenses
involving five different victims.
The State prosecuted the offenses
in three separate trials in the
Circuit Court for Montgomery
County. At the first trial, the state
did not present absence of mistake
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evidence, and Wynn was acquitted
of all charges. At the second trial,
Wynn was tried for crimes against
victims Michael Maples and
Charles Garrison ("Garrison").
The State presented evidence of
past crimes committed by Wynn,
and he was convicted. The third
trial, in which evidence of past
crimes was also admitted, involved
charges for crimes against victim
Michael Quigley ("Quigley").
Admittance of evidence from the
third trial was the only issue
presented before the court of
appeals.
At the third trial, Wynn's
attorney, as a preliminary motion,
moved in limine to exclude
evidence of the Maples and

Garrison housebreakings. Before
the defendant was able to argue the
basis for his motion, the court
allowed the State to proffer its
argument in favor of allowing the
evidence. The State argued that
since Wynn claimed to have
innocently purchased the property
stolen from Quigley's home at a
flea market, the defendant implied
that he obtained Quigley's
property by mistake. The State
further argued that because Wynn
implicitly raised the issue of
mistaken possession, the evidence
of other crimes should have been
allowed to show the absence of
mistake, pursuant to the exception
in Rule 5-404(b). The trial court
agreed with the State and allowed
evidence
of the
Garrison
housebreaking.
At trial, asserting that he never
raised the mistake of defense,
Wynn objected to the State calling
Garrison as a witness. The court
overruled the objection and
allowed Garrison to describe the
housebreaking and theft of his
residence. During the defense's
case, Wynn himself did not testify,
but offered evidence that he
purchased the items taken from
Quigley'S residence at a flea
market without knowing the goods
were stolen. At no time did Wynn
claim he entered Quigley's home
or that he committed a
housebreaking by mistake. Wynn,
in fact, claimed he did not commit
the crime at all.
Wynn was
convicted of all charges and
29.1 U. Ball. L.F. 85
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appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland, where the
conviction was affirmed.
The issue before the Court of
Appeals of Maryland was whether
the trial court properly allowed the
State to use evidence of prior
crimes pursuant the absence of
mistake exception of Rule 5404(b). Wynn, 351 Md. at 316,
718 A.2d at 592. The court began
its
analysis by exammmg
Maryland Rule of Evidence 5404(b) which sets forth, in part,
that evidence of prior crimes,
wrongs, or acts shall not be offered
to prove character or to show
conformity with the crime charged
unless the purpose of the evidence
is to show absence of mistake. !d.
The court then reviewed under
what situations the absence of
mistake exception is applicable.
Id. at 325, 718 A.2d at 597. Most
relevant to the instant case, the
court noted, is the scenario
involving a defendant who admits
to committing the crime, but
claims to have done so by mistake.
Id. The State may then offer
evidence of other similar crimes as
proof that the defendant did not
accidentally or mistakenly commit
the charged offense, thereby
showing the absence of mistake.
Id.
In further determining the
proper application of the absence
of mistake exception, the court
examined case law from Maryland
and other jurisdictions, including
Hoes v. State, 35 Md. App. 61, 368
A.2d 1080 (1977). Wynn, 351 Md.
at 326, 718 A.2d at 597. The court
in Hoes held that where a
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defendant does not raise mistake as
a defense, but does argue facts that
could be construed as mistake, the
court may apply the absence of
mistake exception. !d. (citing
Hoes, 35 Md. App. 61, 368 A.2d
1080). The defendant in Hoes was
charged with assault with attempt
to maim while using a shotgun.
Id. at 326, 718 A.2d at 597.
Asserting a defense of mistake,
Hoes claimed that the shotgun
accidentally misfired, but, since
Hoes had shot the same victim
several years prior to the trial at
issue, the court permitted the State
to use the prior crime to show
absence of mistake. Id. (citing
Hoes, 35 Md. App. at 62,368 A.2d
at 1082). The court, however,
distinguished Hoes from Wynn.
Unlike Hoes' assertion that he shot
the victim by mistake, the crime
for which Hoes was on trial, Wynn
claimed that he never entered the
Quigley house, not that he entered
the Quigley house by mistake. Id.
The court then cited Emory v.
State, 101 Md. App. 585,647 A.2d
1243 (1995), in which evidence of
absence of mistake was not
admissible. Wynn, 351 Md. at
327, 718 A.2d at 598. In Emory,
the court rejected the application
of the absence of mistake
exception, finding that the
defendant did not raise mistake as
a defense in that he did not argue
that his alleged involvement with
the crime charged was a mistake.
Id. (citing Emory, 101 Md. App. at
608,647 A.2d at 1255).
The court also cited McKinney
v. State, 82 Md. App. 111, 570

A.2d 360 (1990), in which the
defendant ambiguously hinted
towards the defense of mistake,
but never asserted one. Wynn, 351
Md. at 328, 718 A.2d at 589. The
court in McKinney held that
without an assertion of a mistake
defense and no evidence from
which such a defense may be
inferred, there is "no material fact
to be established by the other
crimes evidence," and therefore,
the absence of mistake exception
does not apply.
Id. (citing
McKinney, at 125, 570 A.2d at
367).
A proper application of
absence of the mistake exception,
the court explained, is found in
State v. Brogan, 272 Mont. 156,
900 P.2d 284 (1995). In Brogan,
the defendant allegedly violated a
state statute by having wild elk on
his farm. Wynn, 351 Md. at 328,
718 A.2d at 589. Asserting a
defense of mistake, Brogan
claimed that the elk mistakenly
came onto his property when he
left his gate open. Id. at 329, 718
A.2d at 599. In allowing evidence
of prior crimes and bad acts, the
court in Brogan held that the
evidence was relevant to show
absence of mistake. Id.
Based upon its comprehensive
review of prior case law, the court
held that for the absence of
mistake exception to apply, "the
defendant generally must make
some assertion or put on a defense
that he or she committed the act
for which he or she is on trial, but
did so by mistake." Id. at 330-31,
718 A.2d at 599-600. In so
holding, the court found that the
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absence of mistake exception did
not apply in the present case. Id. at
331,718 A.2d 600. First, the court
determined that Wynn did not
assert that he entered Quigley's
home by mistake, but rather, that
he never entered Quigley's
residence. Id. Thus, the court
concluded, Wynn did not raise the
defense of mistake to the crime
charged. Id. Second, the crime
Wynn claimed to have mistakenly
committed was receiving stolen
goods, not housebreaking or theft,
the crimes for which he was tried.
Id. at 332, 718 A.2d at 600.
Therefore, the crime or bad act
committed by mistake was not the
same crime or bad act for which
the defendant was on trial. !d.
Thus, in the instant case, the court
reasoned that the State should have
been precluded from introducing
evidence of prior housebreaking
convictions at trial. Id.
The court's holding in Wynn v.
State restricts the use of evidence
of past crimes against a defendant
by specifically outlining under
what circumstances the absence of
mistake
exception
applies.
Evidence of prior acts is highly
prejudicial toward defendants as
juries may conclude "once a thief,
always a thief." Further, where
evidence is presented that a
defendant committed a similar
crime or act in the past, juries may
conclude that he or she must have
committed the crime for which he
or she is presently being tried.
Therefore, safeguards such as the
elements set forth by the court
protect the defendant by keeping
the jury focused on the current

trial. If, however, the defendant
opens the door by asserting the
defense of mistake to the crime
charged, he is risking the
introduction of prior similar crimes
even with a limiting instruction.
Defense attorneys need to carefully
weigh whether using the defense
of mistake is prudent where the
defendant has been previously
convicted of similar crimes.
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